Interesting History to Think About: George Washington’s Decision

The Decision

In the fateful Summer of 1776, the combined British armed forces, including their hired Hessian troops, had targeted New York. The English believed that New York should be made the “Seat of War,” because it was an excellent place to launch offensive operations.

Even leading American Generals, Charles Lee and Nathanael Greene, were convinced New York would be of such “vast importance” to the enemy that no time should be lost in preparing for its defense. Historian David McCullough, in 1776, stated General Washington was eager to defend New York, “…because control of its harbor could mean control of the Hudson River and thus the whole Hudson – Lake Champlain corridor north to Canada, which if seized by the enemy could isolate New England from the rest of the other colonies – which, in fact, was exactly the British intention.”[1]

The size of the British military force that arrived to seize control of New York was massive even by European standards. Over 32,000 troops had landed in New York, which was more numerous than the entire civilian population of that city! There were well-armed, well-equipped, and well-trained professional soldiers. They were supported by a British naval armada numbering close to 400 ships, which included twenty frigates, and ten ships-of-the-line, which were the battleships of the era, with each exceeding fifty canons. This was the largest and most powerful military force ever sent from England, or any other nation, in the 18^th century.[2]

Facing this unprecedented English military assault on New York was General Washington, and the undisciplined, poorly trained, and poorly equipped American army, which numbered only 8,880 men, of whom, just 6,923 were “fit for duty.”

General Washington had a realistic view of the difficulties he faced in dealing with the magnitude of the English force, and the area he had to defend. With no navy, he worried about protecting a city bounded on two sides by navigable rivers, and a harbor large enough to accommodate the largest fleet imaginable. General Charles Lee, who was considered an expert on military defense, concluded that without command of the sea, New York could not be held. In a letter to John Adams from his

[1] McCullough, David. 1776, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2005, p. 188.

[2] Tindale, George and Shi, David. America. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1984, p. 152.

headquarters in New York, General Washington stated, “We have nothing, my dear sir, to defend upon, but the protection of a kind Providence and unanimity among ourselves.”[1]

With all of these disadvantages, it was clear the decision to defend New York was based more on Washington’s political judgement than on military strategy. It was Washington’s belief that both Congress and the patriots of the American cause expected every effort would be made to hold the city. Leaving New York, the second largest in the colonies, without a fight, would have a devastating political effect, and loss of support for independence. With this in mind, Washington had General Lee develop a defensive plan for New York. Crucial to Lee’s plan was the defense of the part of Long Island directly across the East River, and the imposing bluffs near the tiny hamlet called Brooklyn. The premise was that an effective defense of New York City would depend on the defense of Long Island. If New York was the key to the continent, then Long Island was the key to New York, and the key to the defense of Long Island was Brooklyn Heights. That Long Island could be a trap for an army, without any navy for support, seems not to have been seriously considered.

The Invasion

On August 22, 1776, the long-awaited British invasion of Long Island began with 4,000 of the King’s elite troops, led by Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, who landed at Gravesend Bay. The landing was successful, with no American opposition. More than ninety ships then ferried over 15,000 additional troops, with forty pieces of artillery. They assembled in perfect formation and took control of the entire area as they waited for the rest of the Hessian landing force.[1]

Washington realized his army was not prepared to meet such a dominant force even in a defensive position. Besides being severely outnumbered, there was even more sickness in the ranks than at any previous time, and few of his officers had any experience facing an enemy on the field of battle. He had only 6,000 inexperienced troops on Brooklyn Heights, with another 3,000 spread over a four-mile ridge, which was so heavily wooded that communication was almost impossible.

The Americans might have had a better chance if they had a calvary to survey the area and provide reliable intelligence, but besides not having a navy, they also lacked a calvary. Although the Continental Congress did not consider a calvary necessary, in this situation they might have discovered the main flaw in the American’s defensive plan. The 3,000 troops that were spread out over the four-mile ridge were to protect the three passes leading to the Brooklyn Heights. Unfortunately, they did not know about a fourth route known as the Jamaican Pass, which led directly behind the American lines.

When the British attacked in the morning, using the Jamaican Pass, the Americans suddenly realized they were being attacked from behind, and were surrounded. Within an hour, the whole left-side of the American line collapsed, sending thousands of men running from the field. Although the Americans were hopelessly outflanked, many like the Marylanders under General Stirling, rallied and struck back five times before they were forced to retreat. General Washington, who observed the flight from a nearby hill, was reported to have said, “Good God, what brave fellows I must this day lose!”[2]

General Howe reported his loses as fifty-nine killed, two hundred sixty-seven wounded, and thirty-one missing. The Hessians had lost only five killed and twenty-six wounded. Howe estimated American losses as over 2,000 killed or wounded, with another 1,000 taken prisoner. Although these figures were exaggerated, the actual losses were significant, with three-hundred Americans killed and 1,000 taken prisoner, including three Generals, Sullivan, Stirling, and Woodhull.[3]

More important than the number of troops lost was the effect the defeat had on the morale of the American army. Accounts of British and Hessian soldiers bayonetting Americans after they had surrendered were alarming. There were repeated stories of Hessians pinning Americans to trees with their bayonets. A letter written by an unnamed British officer appeared in The Massachusetts Spy, described how readily surrendered Americans were “dispatched”:

The Hessians and our Highlanders gave no quarter and it was a fine thing to see with what alacrity they dispatched the rebels with their bayonets after we had surrendered them so that they could not resist . . .You know all stratagems are lawful in war, especially against such vile enemies to their King and country.”[4]

These accounts sent a wave of fear throughout the American ranks, along with the stories of what vile treatment awaited those “fortunate enough” to be taken prisoner.

The Battle of Brooklyn Heights, or Long Island, had been the largest ever fought in North America. With over 40,000 men taking part, the field of battle was spread over six miles, and lasted just over six hours. For the Americans, it was a crushing defeat, and the situation faced by Washington was critical. With a defeated army, and no navy, Long Island had become an English trap.

[1] Ibid., p. 157.

[2] Ibid., p. 177.

[3] Ibid., p. 180.

[4] Ibid., p. 181.

Washington was faced with a terrible dilemma: he could either surrender the entire American army, which would effectively end the Revolution, or attempt to retreat off an island, whose waters were controlled by the largest British fleet ever to leave the shores of England.

Washington called a Council of War and told his senior officers he had decided to take the entire army down from Brooklyn Heights, and escape across the East River by small boats. His generals pointed out the East River was over a mile wide, and if the British fleet discovered such a large flotilla, filled with infantry, the army would be defenseless.

Saving the Entire American Army

At that time, adverse weather conditions kept the British navy from sailing up the East River, and encircling the entire American army on Long Island. Washington knew it was a desperate plan, but had already decided he would depend on a “firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence.”

Washington’s faith was rewarded when he discovered that the last American reinforcements to come over from Manhattan were John Glover’s Company of Marbleheaders. Besides being excellent fisherman, every one of them was an expert oarsman, who had grown up in small boats on the shores of Massachusetts Bay.

During the time the English were forced to delay their attack, because of the weather, the Americans were able to locate every small boat in the area, and were preparing to deal with the wind, rain, and dangerous currents of the East River.

With the small boats in place, Washington was able to begin the evacuation of his forces from Brooklyn Heights. The first troops ordered to ferry off of Long Island found the East River was so rough, no boats could safely cross. General Alexander McDougall, who was in charge of the embarkation, sent a message to Washington stating the retreat would have to be cancelled, due to the adverse weather conditions. Then, as David McCullough described in 1776, “It was about eleven o’clock when, as if by design, the northeast wind died down. Then the wind shifted to the southeast and a small armada of boats, manned by more of John Glover’s Massachusetts’ sailors and fisherman, started over the river from New York, Glover himself crossing to Brooklyn to give directions.”[1] With the sudden change in the wind, additional troops were able to withdraw from the battle line and march silently to the boat landing.

The orderly withdraw of an army in the face of a superior enemy force is considered on of the most difficult of military maneuvers even for the best-trained soldiers. The fact that Washington’s undisciplined, poorly trained, and poorly equipped army could succeed in such an operation seemed unbelievable.

It almost came to a disastrous end because of lack of time. The men at the boat landing were working as fast as possible to get the army across the East River. A Connecticut soldier, who manned on of the boats, would remember making  eleven trips during the night. But now it was dawn, and with the storm ending the Americans realized it was going to be a bright, clear, cloudless day. It also became apparent that time was running out. It was estimated that it would take at least three hours more to evacuate the rest of the army. Without the cover of night to conceal them, their escape was doomed. Then, as recorded in 1776:

Incredibly, yet again, circumstances – fate, luck, Providence, the Hand of God as would be said often – intervened. Just at daybreak a heavy fog settled in over the whole of Brooklyn, concealing everything no less than had the night. It was a fog so thick remembered a soldier, that ‘one could scarcely discern a man at six yards distance.’ Even with the sun up, the fog remained as dense as ever, while over on the New York side of the river there was no fog at all.[2]

The soldier that described the fog was Mayor Ben Tallmadge, who was with one of the last units to depart on the boats. This amazing providential event should be told by the man who actually witnessed it:

As the dawn of the next day approached, those of us who remained in the trenches became very anxious for our safety, and when the dawn appeared, there were several regiments still on duty. At this time a very dense fog began to rise out of the ground and off the river, and it seemed to settle in a peculiar manner over both encampments. I recollect this peculiar providential occurrence perfectly well, and so very dense was the atmosphere that I could scarcely discern a man at six yards distance . . . we tarried until the sun had risen, but the fog remained as dense as ever.”[3]

The fog remained in full strength until the very last boat, with General Washington on board, had departed. Then the fog lifted, and with a clear sky the British soldiers arrived to watch helplessly as the last four boats of the Continental Army rowed safely across the East River. One American soldier wrote: “. . . in less than an hour after the fog having dispersed, the enemy was visible on the shore we had left behind.”[4]

Without a single loss of life, nearly 8,000 men had been extricated from certain death or imprisonment. The only men captured were three who had hung back to plunder.

The immediate reaction of the British was one of utter astonishment. That the rebel army had silently vanished in the night, right under their very noses, was inconceivable. Major Stephen Kemble stated that, “In the morning, to our great astonishment, found they had evacuated all their works on Brookland . . . with not a shot being fired at them . . .neither could our shipping get up for want of wind, and the whole escaped.”[5]

In the Battle of Brooklyn Heights, or Long Island as it was later called, General Washington had learned the invaluable lesson of withdrawal before a vastly superior force, and also a very deep appreciation for “the invisible hand which conducts the affairs of  men.”

[1] Ibid., p. 187-188

[2] Ibid., p. 191.

[3] Marshall, Peter and Manuel, David. The Light and the Glory. Revell: Barker Publishing Group, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2009, pp. 397-398.

[4] McCullough, David. 1776. Simon & Schuster, New York, 2005, p. 191.

[5] Ibid., p. 191.

[1] Marshall, Peter and Manuel, David. The Light and the Glory. Revell: Barker Publishing Group, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 2009, pp. 397-398.

[1] McCullough, David. 1776. Simon & Schuster, New York, 2005, p. 191.

[1] Ibid., p. 191.